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I.

INTRODUCTION

If someone could follow your every move for seven days, what could
that person figure out about you? Could this person find out your hobbies? What
you do for a livelihood? Your address? Maybe even the identities of your friends
and family? As smartphones, wearable technology, and a vast array of other
increasingly complicated technological devices become commonplace in the
United States, so too does it become easier to track where you go and figure out
657
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who you are. In a day not so long ago, law enforcement, through traditional
investigatory techniques, could have been able to pin together a case over time
and make an educated guess at a citizen's most personal information. Now, with
non-physical surveillance technology, the days of guessing may be coming to a
close.
The "digital age" has ushered in an era that has changed our world for
the better, making problems from the past almost unrecognizable to the average
member of Generation Z. The ability to communicate with other people around
the world has never been more robust.1 A contemporary example of removing
barriers of communication would be the ability for many to have meetings, go to
school, and work from home during the COVID-19 pandemic, which could have
even more sharply affected everyone's lives had it not been for
telecommunications
technology. 2
However,
exponentially
increasing
technological development comes at a cost. Privacy, both in the public and
private sphere, is a main concern of this rapidly developing technological
landscape.3 Concerns about the protection of user-privacy have renewed interest
among policymakers and activists alike, both in the United States and
worldwide.4

S. O'Dea, Number of Smartphone Users from 2016 to 2021, STATISTA (Aug. 6, 2021),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/330695/number-of-smartphone-usersworldwide/#:~-:text=The%20number%20of/o20smartphone%20users,the%20100%20million%20
user%20mark (showing the number of total cell phones used worldwide increasing from 1.06

billion in 2012 to 6.4 billion in 2021 and projecting 7.5 billion cell phones used worldwide by
2026).
2
Zoom Video Communications, a digital telecommunications company, increased sales 30fold in the first quarter of 2020, and at its peak usage, Zoom had more than 300 million daily
participants in virtual meetings worldwide. Natalie Sherman, Zoom Sees Sales Boom During

Pandemic, BBC (June 2, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-52884782.

3
See Marc Chase McAllister, GPS and Cell Phone Tracking of Employees, 70 FLA. L. REv.
1265, 1313-17 (2018) (demonstrating the potential for employers to use cell phone apps to track
the location of its employees); Ifeoma Ajunwa, Algorithms at Work: Productivity Monitoring
Applications and Wearable Technology as the New Data-Centric Research Agenda for
Employment and Labor Law, 63 ST. Louis U. L.J. 21 (2018) (documenting the implementation of
productivity monitoring software applications and wearable technology in the workplace, and
arguing there are serious privacy implications with such use); Harvey Gee, Almost Gone: The
Vanishing Fourth Amendment's Allowance of Stingray Surveillance in a Post-Carpenter Age, 28

S. CAL. REV. L. & Soc. JUST. 409, 431-36 (2019) (discussing the erosion of Fourth Amendment
rights, specifically in the context of "Stingray" technologies, which operate as a fake cell tower to
"trick cell phones in the area into transmitting their locations and identifying information"). For an
in-depth look at the socioeconomic factors which can affect "expectations of privacy," see
Stephanie L. Williams, The Haves and Have Nots: Wealth-Based Expectations of Privacy in
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence,45 N. KY. L. REv. 67 (2018).

4
Facebook to Pay Record 5bn to Settle Privacy Concerns, BBC (Jul. 24. 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-49099364; Data Protection in the EU, EUR. COMM'N,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/data-protection-euen
(last visited Nov.
18, 2021) (noting that the General Data Protection Regulation, commonly referred to as the GDPR,
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The use of technology in law enforcement, generally, is a concerning
matter as well. Law enforcement is able to take advantage of new-fangled
technologies to adjust investigatory techniques, revealing more information than
ever before. Specifically, non-physical forms of surveillance, like cell site
location information ("CSLI"), can be used in ways that can track a person's
5
movements, especially when traveling long distances. However, the precision
6
and accuracy of technologies of this type is somewhat disputed. However, it is
undisputed that non-physical surveillance technology has changed the dynamic
of policing in the United States, and if it is available as an investigatory tactic,
law enforcement will use it. Such use by law enforcement calls into question how
and to what extent the Fourth Amendment should protect citizens from nonphysical surveillance technology and whether these are "searches" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
This Note examines how the lower courts have interpreted Fourth
7
Amendment cases since Carpenter v. United States , specifically how these
courts have implemented an interpretation of the mosaic theory and in what
contexts. As technological change has become commonplace, there should be a
broadly outlined standard for how Fourth Amendment rights are implicated in
light of Carpenter. In turn, this will allow lower courts to define the mosaic
theory moving forward, and more effectively adjudicate determinations of
defendants' rights in the digital age. First, this Note will discuss the basic
doctrinal understanding of Fourth Amendment searches. Next, it will discuss the
third-party doctrine and the Supreme Court's decision in Carpenter v. United
States. Then, this Note will discuss and analyze how the lower courts have
reacted to Carpenter in its jurisprudence. Finally, this Note will put forth a
proposal to best reconcile how Fourth Amendment jurisprudence involving nonphysical surveillance technology should be handled in the wake of Carpenter.

is new, sweeping legislation aimed at protecting privacy rights in the content of increasing data

mining and technological abilities).
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211-12 (2018).
5
6

The consensus is that CSLI can reveal sensitive information about an individual's location,

and courts routinely handle it as such. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
However, some commentators have raised questions about the propriety of relying on it for precise
location. GPS location, which is now available for most, if not all, smartphones and other wearable
technology, such as Apple Watches, are considered substantially more accurate. The Two Towers:
2014),
6,
(Sep.
THE
ECONOMIST,
Data,
Mobile-Phone
of
The
Abuse
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2014/09/06/the-two-towers.

7

138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
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FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE SINCE KATZ AND THE
MOSAIC THEORY

The Supreme Court's interpretation of the scope and meaning of the
Fourth Amendment has perhaps been its most volatile doctrine, ranging from a
traditional property rights-based analysis to a consideration of normal citizens'
privacy expectations.' The overarching standard for most Fourth Amendment
determinations of whether a "search" has taken place is dependent upon the Katz
test; however, in recent years, the Court has complicated this assumption.' Since
the formulation of the Katz test, the Fourth Amendment has been understood to
encompass an evolving standard that conforms with society's reasonable
expectations of privacy.' 0 In Part A, this author will briefly summarize what is
and is not a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. Next, in Part B, this author
will briefly summarize the third-party doctrine, an exception to the warrant
requirement under the Fourth Amendment. Finally, in Part C, this author will
summarize the "mosaic theory" and Carpenterv. United States."
A.

What Is A "Search" Under the FourthAmendment?

The Fourth Amendment proscribes that "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated."" It further elaborates that no
"warrants" for searches or seizures shall be issued "but upon probable cause."13
The term "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment is a complete

8

There are, generally, two different historical periods for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
The former was marked by a property rights-based analysis of the Fourth Amendment. A violation
of the Fourth Amendment would only occur "when law enforcement "inv[ades]... private
property, be it ever so minute..." See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886) (quoting

Entick v. Carrington, 18 Howell St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (1765) (Eng.)). The second period is
characterized by the Katz test. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
9
Compare Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) with United States v. Jones, 565
U.S. 400 (2012) (holding for the first time since Katz that property law principles were still
applicable to the Fourth Amendment).
10
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
"
138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations
of Privacy, Fourth Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory, 2015 SuP. CT. REv. 205, 205-

06 (2015).
12

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

13
Id. "'Probable cause' is a concept that is imprecise, fluid, and very dependent on the
context." Probable Cause, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/probable_cause

(last visited Nov. 19, 2021). The Supreme Court has held that a flexible approach should be used
by lower courts when determining probable cause, using a "practical, non-technical" standard
which takes into account the "factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which

reasonable and prudent men . . . act." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983) (citation omitted).
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term of art.14 Thus, the word search, in this context, does not mean "looking for
something." " Rather, it refers to a specific moment in time where the police
have breached the reasonable expectation of privacy and now have an intimate
16
view of a private citizen's person, place, or effect.
During an investigation, the police may search a person's belongings
when they have ascertained probable cause and have gotten a warrant approved
by a magistrate."7 However, there are several situations-called exigent
circumstances, essentially emergency situations-where warrants are not
required. 18 The Supreme Court has deemed such searches reasonable within the
19
meaning of the Fourth Amendment; thus, these searches are constitutional.
The problem traditionally arises when law enforcement conducts a
search without previously acquiring a warrant, and there are no applicable
exigent circumstances. The Katz test dictates that a search occurs when a twopart requirement is surpassed: "first that a person have exhibited an actual

See JOSHUA DRESSLER, GEORGE C. THOMAS III, & DANIEL MEDWED, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
14
INVESTIGATING CRIME (6th ed., 2006). However, where the Fourth Amendment hinges on the
"reasonableness" of the search, or whether it requires a warrant has been an ideological dispute on
the Court for the past several decades. See Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of
Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MIss. L.J. 1133, 1156 (2012) (discussing
critiques of "reasonableness" from the political "left," stating "[t]he problematic nature of openended reasonableness standards has led some feminist scholars to argue in favor of more subjective
standards over purportedly neutral objective ones").

Thomas K. Clancy, What is a "Search" Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 70
15
ALBANY L. REv. 1, 22-23 (2006).
See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 11 MICH. L. REv. 311, 314
16

(2012).
17

See DRESSLER ET AL., supra note 14.

18

INST.,
INFO.
LEGAL
Circumstances,
Exigent
See
https://www.law.comell.edu/wex/exigent circumstances#:~: text=Exigent%20circumstances%20
%2D%20%22circumstances%20that%20would,some%20other%20consequence%20improperly

%20frustrating (last visited Nov. 19, 2021).
19
Exigent circumstances have been defined by the 9' Circuit as "circumstances that would
cause a reasonable person to believe that entry (or other relevant prompt action) was necessary to
prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the
escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law
enforcement efforts." United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 ( 9th Cir. 1984), overruled
on other grounds by Estate of Merchant v. Comm'r, 947 F.2d 1390 ( 9 * Cir. 1991). Additionally,
police may be able to use the exigent circumstances exception even when there is a mistake.
Kentucky v. King, 563 US 452, 463 (2011) (holding that the exigent circumstances rule applies
when police do not gain entry to a premises by means of actual or threatened violation of the Fourth
Amendment). Finally, the Court has found that the exigent circumstances exception "almost
always" applies when police do a warrantless blood test to an unconscious driver suspected to be

under the influence because a less-invasive breath test would be impossible. Mitchell v. Wisconsin,
139 S. Ct. 2525, 2531 (2019). However, the Court previously held that the "natural metabolization
of alcohol in the bloodstream" does not present a per se exigency that creates an exigent

circumstance; instead, exigency in cases where police are looking to obtain a blood-test for alcohol
content should be "determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances." Missouri

v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 145 (2013).
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(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'2 0 The Katz test is employed in
a sequential way, meaning that the "courts take a snapshot of the [interaction
with law enforcement] and assess it in isolation." 2 ' Courts have referred to this
process as "inherent" when evaluating the Fourth Amendment.22 As Professor
Kerr states, the Supreme Court has articulated "each 'particular governmental
invasion"' of expectations of privacy, "starting with the 'initial' step and then
separately analyzing the 'subsequent' steps. 23 Thus, the sequential analysis
comes into play when law enforcement shows conduct violative of an
individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy ... [such as] break[ing] into a
private, enclosed space, [] a home, a car, a package, or a person's pockets.""
Importantly, the sequential analysis is also followed when remedying
Fourth Amendment rights violations.25 "Remedies apply only if the
unconstitutional act caused the discovery of a specific piece of evidence ."26
Therefore, when law enforcement discovers a piece of evidence during an invalid
search, that evidence will be excluded from the trial upon the finding of a Fourth
Amendment violation. However, that does not preclude evidence previously
found during a valid search from being included in the criminal trial. For
example, if the arresting officer has validly arrested you based on probable cause,
he may search your person and fmd evidence of criminal activity. 27 However,
this does not give the officer the right to search through your car once you have
been detained, and if he finds any further evidence in there, it may be excluded. 28

20

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). To some extent,

that Katz test itself is misleading. Scholars have noted through empirical studies that the first prong
of the test, whether an individual has an actual or subjective expectation of privacy, has almost
been completely ignored by courts when deciding Fourth Amendment questions. See generally,
Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U. CyH. L.
REv. 113 (2015) (arguing that the vast majority of courts, including on occasion the Supreme court,
do not consider the first step of the Katz test when conducting an analysis of Fourth Amendment

"searches"). This is ironic, mostly because the holding in Katz itself relied so heavily on the fact
that the suspect had a reasonable expectation of privacy in conducting a conversation within a
phone booth. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
21
22

23

Kerr, supra note 16, at 315.
United States v. Beaudoin, 362 F.3d 60, 70-71 (1St Cir. 2004).
Kerr, supra note 16, at 316 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 319 U.S. 1, 19 (1968); United States v.

Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1973)).
24
Id. at 316-17 (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); United States v.
Ross, 465 U.S. 798, 807-09, 823-25 (1982); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984);
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 378 (1993)). This is opposed to the Mosaic Theory of the
Fourth Amendment, as discussed later. See Kerr, supra note 16.
25
Kerr, supra note 16, at 319.

Id. (citing Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 590-94 (2006)).
27
See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925); Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20, 30 (1925); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
28
See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 344 (2009).
26
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Moreover, it follows that any evidence thereafter found is "fruit of a poisonous
tree," which dictates that any evidence found as consequence of a
unconstitutional search shall be excluded. 29
B.

The Third-PartyDoctrine

The third-party doctrine is arguably the most substantial exception to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. 30 At base, the third-party doctrine
states that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy when her or she
discloses information voluntarily to a third-party. 31 A classic hypothetical is that
if Person A and Person B are friends and communicate frequently, there is some
degree of trust between them. If Person A tells Person B a secret, that he is
32
illegally dealing drugs, then he has opened his so-called "circle of trust" to
Person B. If Person B then turns around and offers that information to law
enforcement agents, breaking the circle of trust, Person A cannot suppress
evidence of the conversation because Person A had been the one who voluntarily
33
disclosed that he dealt drugs to Person B in the first place.
The third-party doctrine took on substantial new meaning post-Katz in
United States v. White, which expanded the third-party doctrine to conversations
34
During the
with informants that were recorded on a hidden device.
investigation, law enforcement did not pursue a warrant for the informant to

29
Fruit
of
a
Poisonous
Tree,
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fruit_of thepoisonoustree (last visited Nov. 19, 2021).
See RICHARD M. THOMPSON 11, CONG. RscH. SERV.,
30
THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE 1 (2014).

31
32

R43586,

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971).
Credit to Professor John E. Taylor for the term "circle of trust," which he used quite

frequently during our Criminal Procedure class. John E. Taylor, Lectures on Criminal Procedure,
delivered during his Criminal Procedure: Investigation course taught at West Virginia University

College of Law in the fall of 2019.
33
Id.
401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971). Notice the mirroring of the Katz test language---emphasizing a
34
"reasonable expectation" of privacy. The White decision largely rested on Hoffa v. United States,

385 U.S. 293 (1966), which held "however strongly a defendant may trust a colleague, his
expectations of confidentiality are not privileges when the colleague flips on him to the police."
As one scholar has noted, the Court's distinction with the third-party doctrine seemingly turns on

whether the "eavesdropper" is visibly present to the criminal defendant:
The law treats secret surveillance of speech or other behavior largely according
to whether the surveilling agent is visible or invisible to the subject. An agent,
visibly present through masquerading [as a confidant], is thought to gather
evidence in a fundamentally different manner than a concealed agent or a
hidden electronic device. The theory is that the contents of the mind,
deliberately revealed to another person, are willingly shared, while the secret
eye or ear, possibly electronically enhanced, bypasses constitutional concern
to spirit the evidence away.
H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of a Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the

CurrentRules ofAccess andRestraint, 87

COLUM.

L. REv. 1137, 1151 (1987).
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record the suspect's conversations via a concealed listening device. 35 The Court
held that a warrant was not necessary to authorize this type of informant
surveillance. 36 Rather, the Court reasoned that the law permits the frustration of
actual expectations of privacy by associates, or "fake friends," when those
associates divulge their conversations to law enforcement. 37 Thus, the analysis
does not change when the "fake friend" is concealing a recording device that
secretly documents the actual conversations. 38
The Court has held that the third-party doctrine is applicable to several
different scenarios, always involving a criminal suspect voluntarily disclosing
information which eventually ends up in the hands of law enforcement. 39 Many
of these expansions are fairly analogous to our original hypothetical, as well as
United States v. White. In these "circle of trust" scenarios, a suspect tells another
individual (who may be undercover law enforcement) incriminating information.
That other individual hands over that information to law enforcement by
recording their conversations, giving law enforcement access to the place of
conversation, or otherwise assisting law enforcement. 40 This is an important and
legitimate tool for law enforcement to deploy. Law enforcement activities would
be significantly hindered if it was not allowed to utilize the probative value of
individuals who have turned "state witness" or are covert law enforcement
agents. For example, it would be extremely difficult to prevent inchoate crimes
from coming to fruition if all information conveyed to law enforcement by third
parties were deemed an invasion of an objective expectation of privacy.
However, the Supreme Court has also allowed the third-party doctrine
to encompass areas that are fairly unanalogous to the "circle of trust"
hypothetical from above. In Smith v. Maryland, the Court held the third-party
doctrine applies to commercial transactions voluntarily entered into by criminal
defendants. 4 1 There, law enforcement, without a warrant, requested that a
telephone provider place a pen register on a suspect's incoming and outgoing

36

White, 401 U.S. at 746-47.
Id. at 753-54.

3

Id. at 752.

35

38
Id. at 754. This Author uses the term "fake friend" or "fake friends" to refer to an individual
who is working with law enforcement as a confidential informant.

39

See id. at 745 (where a household owner allowed a government agent to hide in the kitchen

closet with a recording device while having incriminating conversations with suspect; Hoffa v.

United States, 385 U.S. 293, 295-96 (1966) (where law enforcement placed an agent, who
defendant conveys incriminating information to under the guise of being a "false friend"); Lopez

v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 430-31, 439 (1963) (where a "false friend," wearing a concealed
tape recorder, recorded conversations with suspect and conveyed the information to law

enforcement); Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 750-57 (1952) (decided on different grounds,
pre-Katz, but involved a "false friend" wearing a wire transmitter which conveyed a conversation
with a criminal suspect to law enforcement).
40
41

See Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 295-96.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737, 745-46 (1979).
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calls, to which it complied.4 2 The Court held that a warrant was not required
because the telephone company's placement of the pen register satisfied the
third-party doctrine. 43 In its reasoning, the Court emphasized a lack of the
petitioner's subjective expectation of privacy at the telephone company's
facilities.' Additionally, the pen register would not be able to "listen in" on the
conversations the defendant's phone would transmit; it would only transmit the
telephone numbers conveyed. 45 This type of information is frequently conveyed
to telephone companies, as an individual would be unable to place a call without
"'expos[ing]' that information to [the telephone company's] equipment in the
ordinary course of business.... "46 Thus, "petitioner assumed the risk that the
47
company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed."
Justice Marshall's dissent in Smith v. Maryland highlights several
considerations and questions about whether individuals would have a reasonable
48
and objective expectation of privacy in their commercial transactions. Justice
Marshall questions the reasoning that individuals would expect information for
49
business purposes to be disclosed "to other persons for other purposes."
Furthermore, Justice Marshall questions whether one could truly "assume the
risk," or "open up their circle of trust," when dealing with an entity that provides
what many people would consider to be an essential service in the modem
world. 50 Justice Marshall concludes that he would not expand the third-party
51
doctrine to transactions of a commercial nature.
2
Since the third-party doctrine first appeared in United States v. MillerS
and Smith v. Maryland, it has been used to warrantlessly request that third parties
convey business records to aid in law enforcement investigations. This can

42

Id. at 737.

Id. at 743 (stating, "even if petitioner did harbor some subjective expectation that the phone
numbers he dialed would remain private, this expectation is not one society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable") (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 742. The pen register had never been placed on the defendant's property; rather, it had
4s

43

been placed at the headquarters of the telephone company. Id.
45
Id. at 741-42.
46
Id. at 744 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)).
47

Id.

Id. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating "[e]ven assuming, as I do not, that individuals
4
'typically know' that a phone company monitors calls for internal reasons, . . . it does not follow
that they expect this information to be made available to the public in general or the government
in particular.").
49

Id.

Id. at 750 (comparing the voluntariness of letting a single individual, or group of individuals,
50
into your circle of trust with "forego[ing] use of what for many has become a personal or
professional necessity..."). This quote resonates to a greater degree 42 years later.
51

Id. at 752.

52
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (holding that defendant had no protected Fourth
Amendment interest in banking records voluntarily conveyed to bank officers).
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include banks, phone companies, internet service providers, and e-mail servers. 53
Regardless of what light one sees the third-party doctrine in, it is hard to avoid
the reality that Justice Marshall's concerns in 1979 resonate even more today. a
More controversially, it became apparent that some courts viewed CSLI data as
falling under the third-party doctrine. The nature of growing cell phone usage in
the United States, and worldwide, forced the Court to reconcile its loyalty with
the third-party doctrine to a fundamentally different technological landscape. In
two cases, the Supreme Court tweaked the third-party doctrine, specifically as it
applied to CSLI data, which ensured broader protection for individuals under the
Fourth Amendment.
C.

The Mosaic Theory of the FourthAmendment and Carpenter

The mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment is a different analysis than
under the "sequential" approach. Rather than seeing law enforcement
interactions as a step-by-step approach, the mosaic theory views these
interactions as a collective whole.55 If the government conducts a substantial
amount of "non-searches," when those pieces are added together, a court may
find that a search has been conducted when viewing the entire ordeal from the
aggregate.56 Thus, the mosaic theory fundamentally changes the court's analysis
in regard to a Fourth Amendment violation. Rather than viewing a government
interaction in isolation, and whether that interaction invaded a reasonable
expectation of privacy, a court instead would scrutinize the duration of the
interaction.
1.

United States v. Jones: The Mosaic Theory First Appears

The mosaic theory first appears in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in
United States v. Jones, which invalidated the use of a "beeper" on a vehicle to
track a suspect for 24-hours on public roads. 57 The Court unanimously decided

5

See, e.g., id. (holding that the third-party doctrine applies to information voluntarily

conveyed to bank officers); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that the third-party
doctrine applies to information voluntarily conveyed to telephone companies); United States v.

Trader, 981 F.3d 961, 968-69 (1It' Cir. 2020) (holding that the third-party doctrine applies to email
and IP address information conveyed to law enforcement through messaging app).
5
With access to CSLI data, the government would not only have access to information which
the voluntary disclosure of is questionable but through the nature of cell phone usage would be
fundamentally different.
5

Kerr, supra note 16, at 320.

56

Id.

57
565 U.S. 400 (2012). A "beeper" is a device that can track the location of an individual by
attaching to a vehicle, or other object. Such devices have been used for a significant amount of
time in law enforcement and have consistently presented Fourth Amendment issues. See Clifford
S. Fishman, Electronic Tracking Devices and the Fourth Amendment: Knotts, Karo, and the
Questions Still Unanswered, 34 CATH. U.L. REv. 277,282 (1985).
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that the case presented a violation of the defendant's reasonable expectation of
58
privacy; however, the Court could not agree on why. Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, reintroduced trespass principles to the Court's analysis of the
Fourth Amendment, holding that the installation constituted a trespass on private
property.5"In Justice Sotomayor's concurrence, however, she mainly focused on
the potential that non-physical surveillance has to violate subjective and
objective expectations of privacy, rather than focusing on the trespass and
60
physical intrusion, as the majority did. Thus, for situations involving
surveillance without a physical intrusion, as in Jones, the majority's test would
"provide little guidance." 61 Therefore, Justice Sotomayor concluded that "[she]
would take [the special circumstances] of GPS monitoring into account when
considering the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the
sum of one's public movements." 62 In the next paragraph, Justice Sotomayor
questions whether "it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties."63 It should also be noted that while writing separately,
Justice Alito reaches the same conclusion, stating, "I would analyze the question
presented in this case by asking whether respondent's reasonable expectations of
privacy were violated by the long-term monitoring of the movements of the
vehicle he drove."" Thus, both concurrences are uneasy about the utilization of
non-physical surveillance technology in conjunction with citizens' Fourth
Amendment rights.
2.

Cell-Site Location Information ("CSLI")

Before discussing Carpenter v. United States and its reasoning, it is
important to have a basic grasp on how CSLI works and how that, in turn, relates
to the third-party doctrine. At base, "cell phones perform their wide and growing
'cell sites."' 65
variety of functions by connecting to a set of radio antennas called
Cell sites are usually attached to a large tower, but are scattered throughout more
66
urban areas on buildings, telephone poles, light posts, and other similar fixtures.
In order to function properly, cellular phones continuously search an

58

Jones, 565 U.S. at 400.

59

Id. at 404.

60

Id. at 415.

61

Id.

62

Id. at 416.

63

Id. at 417.

6
65

Id. at 419 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Carpenter v. U.S., 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018)

66

Id.

668
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environment in order to obtain the best possible signal from a cell site. 67 Cellular
phones, depending on the manufacturer and type, can perform this function up
to several times a minute, even when the owner is not consciously using the
device. 68
"Each time the phone connects to a cell site, it generates a time-stamped
record known as cell-site location information (CSLI)." 69 The precision of this
system to track the location of the cellular phone user varies widely with the
concentration of cell sites within a given area. 70 In rural areas, for example, the
nearest cell site may be several miles away. In a more concentrated, urban area,
the nearest cell site may be a matter of yards.7 ' However, if multiple cell towers
record information, law enforcement can "triangulate" the signal and locate a
phone with much greater precision-sometimes within five to ten feet. 72
Wireless carriers collect and store CSLI for their own business purposes,
mostly utilizing it to update their own networks to figure out where "weak spots"
in wireless coverage exist. 73 Additionally, businesses utilize CSLI to apply
"roaming" charges to a customer's bill when the customer is using the cellular
phone out-of-network. 74 CSLI has been tracked since cellular phones first
entered the market, mostly when incoming calls were placed and now text
messages; however, given the vast array of functions, apps, and services that a
modern smartphone provides, most cell phones are continuously pinging into a
cell site when it is turned on. 75 Thus, this can generate a "map" of where the
cellular phone user has been, regardless of what the user is doing, as long as the
cellular phone is turned on and is on their person.7 6 Because documenting the

67
Id. Currently, there are several "cellular" phone and smart phone providers which allow the
user to turn off "cell data" usage. Turning off this function will stop the phone from connecting to
a cell site. The phone can still be functional using Wi-Fi. However, when the phone is out of range
for a Wi-Fi network, it is essentially useless for calls, interaction apps, the internet, or other
functions which require connection. However, local functions, such as using the calculator or
looking at your calendar, remain operational.

68
69

70

Id.
Id.
See Alexandra C. Smith, Pinging into Evidence: The Implications of Historical Cell Site

Location Information, 120 W. VA. L. REV. 331, 335 (2017).
7'
72

See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2225 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Cell Phone Location Tracking, NAT'L Ass'N
of CRIM.
DEF.
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2016-06-07_Cell-TrackingPrimer_Final.pdf.

LAWS.,

7

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.

?4

Id.

75

Id.
While Carpenteris constrained to discussing cellular phones, an important development to

76

consider is the introduction of the Apple Watch 5 and other similar devices. The original Apple
Watch acted as a "mirror" of the cell phone screen, and thus, could only operate in conjunction
with the user's cell phone. The cellular phone was required to be within 15 feet in order for the

Apple Watch to operate properly. However, the newer Apple Watch 5 has the ability to make calls,
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cellular phone's location through CSLI is voluntary information disclosed to a
77
manufacturer, it would typically fall under the third-party doctrine.
3.

Carpenterv. United States

Carpenter v. United States was the first case to consider the
78
implications of CSLI in conjunction with the third-party doctrine. The case
involved fifteen accomplices, including Timothy Carpenter, who conspired to
79
Based upon
rob nine different store locations in Michigan and Ohio.
enforcement
law
information gathered from conspirators-turned-informants,
80
Law
authorities discovered the cellular phone number of Carpenter.
enforcement then proceeded to apply for court orders under the Stored
Communications Act to obtain cell phone records for Carpenter, as well as
81
The Stored
several other suspects implicated by the informant.
disclosure of
the
compel
to
Government
"the
Communications Act permitted
facts
articulable
and
specific
certain telecommunications records when it 'offers
'are
sought
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe' that the records
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation."82 Notably,
Carpenter argued that, regardless of the statute, the police needed to obtain a
83
warrant support by probable cause in order to access the cell-site data. Using
the CSLI, law enforcement was able to obtain 12,898 location points mapping
84
out Carpenter's movements over a 127 day time period. "Carpenter was
charged with six counts of robbery and an additional six counts of carrying a
85
firearm during a federal crime of violence." Carpenter then moved to suppress
send text messages, stream music, and keep track of your location while being away from your

phone. Thus, the Apple Watch 5 is wearable technology which acts independent of a cellular phone
and is also pinging into cell sites. This is also true for iPads and other tablets which use cellular

data.

See

Use

Apple

Watch

With

a

Cellular

Network,

APPLE,

https://support.apple.com/guide/watch/use-your-apple-watch-with-a-cellular-network-

apd9al68c68b/watchos (last visited Nov. 19, 2021).
See generally Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2012).
77
Id. at 2206. Some courts considered warrantless collection of CSLI data to be valid under
78
the Fourth Amendment; however, those lower courts had "questioned whether precedent about
phone booths, pen registers, and microfilm provides an adequate framework for analyzing privacy
expectations in the "smartphone" era. See, e.g., In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d

600, 611-12 (5th Cir. 2013), abrogatedby United States v. Beverly, 943 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2019)
(reasoning, in part, that "[CSLI] is clearly a business record. The cell service provider collects and
stores historical cell site data for its own business purposes .... ").

81

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
Id.
Id.

82

Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. @ 2703(d) (West 2021)).

83

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.

84

Id.
Id.

79

80

85
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the CSLI because law enforcement's seizure of the records were not obtained
pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause. 86
The Court started its analysis with Knotts, which concluded that
"'augment[ed]' visual surveillance did not constitute a search because '[a] person
traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in his movements from one place to another."' 87 This is because the
movements of the vehicle had been "'voluntarily conveyed to anyone who
wanted to look,"' therefore, there was no privacy interest in the public
movements. 88 However, the Court noted some qualifying language
distinguishing more traditional tracking methods from a broader, more
substantial mode of surveillance. 89 The Court also cited United States v. Jones,
standing for the principle that physical trespass to obtain 24-hour surveillance
violated the Fourth Amendment, plus noting the two concurrences by Justice
Sotomayor and Justice Alito.90
The Court declined to extend Smith and Miller, holding that the thirdparty doctrine was inapplicable to cover the "novel circumstances" of 24-hour
CSLI surveillance. 9 1 The court concluded that law enforcement using its own
technology, or leveraging the technology of a wireless carrier, was an invasion
of an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in his physical movements. 92
The Court reasoned that the immensely personal and probative value of such
records, and CSLI data becoming "remarkably easy, cheap, and efficient
compared to traditional investigative tools" made it a different beast than other
applications of the third-party doctrine.9 3 The nature of cellular phones, and the
accuracy of the location information made them "almost a 'feature of human
anatomy'. . . track[ing] nearly exactly the movements of its owner." 94 At base,
the Court viewed the nature of information disclosed through third-parties as a
fundamentally different proposition.
The Court moved on to attack the second rationale for the third-party
doctrine, the voluntariness of an individual's exposure.9 5 The Court reasoned that
CSLI data is never "shared" as an individual normally understands the term. 96

86

Id.

87
Id. at 2215 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983)) (internal citation
omitted).
88
Id. (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281).
89
Id. (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283-84) (noting that "different constitutional principles may
be applicable if twenty-four-hour surveillance of any citizen of this country [were] possible").
90

Id.

91

Id. at 2217.
Id. at 2217.
Id. at2218.

92
93
94

95
96

Id. (citing Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)).
Id. at 2220.
Id.
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Rather, cellular phones have become "'a pervasive and insistent part of daily
life."' 97 Second, there is no voluntary, intentional step that a user does to activate
98
CSLI tracking, beyond merely operating the phone. Rather than actively
conveying information, such as conveying information to a bank about financial
records; here, there is nothing a user could do to prevent the recording of this
information outside of foregoing cellular phone usage. The Court concluded, "in
no meaningful sense does the user voluntarily 'assume the risk' of turning over
99
a comprehensive dossier of his physical movements." Therefore, the Court
concluded as a whole that the warrantless access of CSLI from wireless carriers
00
was a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.1
Based on this analysis of the issue, importantly, the Court did not
0
articulate a standard for the use of CSLI data.1 ' Justice Roberts, writing for the
majority, specified the narrowness of the holding, explicitly stating that the thirdparty doctrine is still good law and does not address other business records, or
0 2
information collection techniques. Additionally, in a footnote, Justice Roberts
specified that, for the purposes of Carpenter, "it is sufficient for our purposes
today to hold that accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment
search."1 03 Some have purported that the test emerging from Carpenterindicates
that lower courts should examine (1) "the deeply revealing nature" of the
information being sought; (2) "its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach;" and
(3) "the inescapable and automatic nature of its collection.. . ."104 The Court, in
its conclusion, seemingly endorsed the mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment;
05
Lack of an express
however, it does not explicitly state the proposition.'

Id. (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 385) (noting that a cellular phone "faithfully follows its owner
beyond public thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor's offices, political headquarters,
and other potentially revealing locales"). The Court cites Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 395

97

(2014), to show that "nearly three-quarters of smart phone users report being within five feet of
their phones most of the time, with 12% admitting that they even use their phones in the shower."

The Court hammers home the broader point-it views cellular phones and law enforcement use of
CSLI data as a different beast because of its particularly revealing nature. See Paul Ohm, The Many
Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 357, 360 (2018) (stating, "[r]ecent advances in
information technology are different in kind, not merely in degree from what has come before ...
[this] has never before received such a profound endorsement from the Supreme Court").
98

Id.

99

Id.

100

Id. at 2219.

101

See generally id.

102

Id. at 2220-21 ("Our decision is a narrow one . .

[it] do[es] not disturb the application of

Smith and Miller or call into question conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as

security cameras; Nor do we address other business records that might incidentally reveal location
information. Further our opinion does not consider other collection techniques involving foreign

affairs or national security.").
103
Id. at 2217 n.3.

104
105

Id. at 2223; Ohm, supra note 97.
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206.
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standard-in conjunction with a lack of guidance of how Carpentershould apply
to analogous methods of non-physical surveillance-has left lower courts with a
limited framework to apply the mosaic theory to other technologies.
III.

THE MOSAIC THEORY POST-CARPENTER

Several lower courts have been left with an indeterminate line of where
Carpenterextends and in what contexts. As the Court made clear in Carpenter,
citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their own CSLI, and the
third-party doctrine is inapplicable. Despite some scholars' optimism,106 lower
courts have seemingly not taken an aggressive step, post-Carpenter,to extend its
reasoning to other non-physical surveillance technology, the third-party doctrine
generally, or articulating a standard for CSLI data past seven days. Most lower
courts have rejected, either expressly or implicitly, the application of the mosaic
theory to other contexts outside of CSLI technology.
A.

Lower Courts Declining to Apply the Mosaic Theory's Rationale to
Other Forms of Surveillance Technology.

Since Carpenter, most lower courts have declined to extend the mosaic
theory's rationale to other types of surveillance technologies. Several courts have
followed the Court's preferred formulation of a "narrow" holding in order to
reach these results. First, in United States v. Trader, the 11th Circuit declined to
extend Carpenter's reasoning to e-mail messaging "cloud" services and IP
addresses associated with private messaging apps.1 07 The case involved a
criminal defendant accused of soliciting and sending sexually explicit pictures to
minors through online messaging apps.108 The 11th Circuit reasoned, absent
Carpenter, the third-party doctrine would normally apply to online messaging
services, and that he "voluntarily... [and] affirmatively act[ed] to open the app,
[] log in," and shared his IP address when using the app without taking steps to
protect it.1 09 The Court held that Carpenterwas inapplicable to online messaging
services because of "Carpenter's'narrow' exception ... appl[ying] only to some
[CSLI], not ordinary business records like email addresses and internet protocol
addresses."10

106
See, e.g., Ohm, supra note 97, at 361 (arguing that "[w]hen lower
courts apply these factors,
they are likely to extend the Fourth Amendment to cover many important commercial databases
that have never before required a warrant for police to access"). While Carpenterwas merely three
years ago, and developments could occur in the future, the current view of lower courts errs on the
side of narrowness over a broader formulation of Carpenterand its reasoning.

107 981 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2020).
108
Id. The defendant was communicating through a private messaging service called "Kik." Id.
at 964.
109
110

Id. at 967.

Id. at 967-68 (citing Carpenter, 139 S. Ct. at 2220).
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In LopezGamez v. State, a Texas state criminal appellate court expressly
declined to extend the mosaic theory to GPS location systems in automobiles."'
The case involved a GPS location system inside of Ford F-150 truck. The Ford
12
dealership, which expressly
F-150 was purchased from a "tote-the-note"
owner as a contingency in
dealership
the
with
shared
be
location
GPS
required
3
obtained GPS
enforcement
Law
repossessed."
be
to
had
truck
the
event
the
4
The Court
dealership."
third-party
the
through
truck
the
information from
to the
apply
not
did
theory,
mosaic
the
thus
reasoned that Carpenter, and
as
agreed,
expressly
wife
his
voluntary GPS tracking because the defendant and
truck's
their
access
to
a condition of purchase, to allow the dealership
whereabouts." 5 Thus, the Court expressly rejected Carpenter'sapplication and
impliedly rejected an extension of the mosaic theory to GPS monitoring in
automobiles."1 6
Several other lower courts have followed this general reasoning in order
to decline extending Carpenter'smandate to other technological devices and
services. These situations include declining to apply the mosaic theory to state
7
monitoring programs about prescription medications;" "iCloud" and other
similar services;1 8 and social media information, such as a user sharing extensive
information with Facebook.1 9 Moreover, several lower courts, including the

622 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. App. 2020), petitionfordiscretionaryreview refused (Jan. 13, 2021).
A "tote-the-note" dealership is one which directly finances the automobiles that they sell,
instead of relying on a traditional banking institution. See What Does "Tote the Note" Mean?,
DRIVETIME, https://www.drivetime.com/vft/tote-the-note (last visited Nov. 18, 2021).
1

112

"3

LopezGamez, 622 S.W.3d at 450-51.

114

Id.

"15
116

Id. at 455.
Id.; but see United States v. Diggs, 385 F. Supp. 3d 648 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (holding that

Carpenteris applicable to long-term acquisition of GPS data from an automobile, thus accepting

the mosaic theory).
See, e.g., United States v. Gayden, 977 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that Carpenter
does not apply to Florida's Prescription Drug Monitoring Program because the defendant did not
"1

maintain a "special privacy interest" in his prescribing records and was voluntary); United States
v. Motley, 443 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1213 (D. Nev. 2020) (holding that no "search" occurred because

law enforcement sought information from a public service, the Nevada Board of Pharmacy, and
"individuals who receive prescription drugs do not have any reasonable expectation of
privacy....").
11

See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, No. 1:18-CR-00181, 2019 WL 1568154, at *4 (N.D. Ga.

Apr. 11, 2019) (holding that Carpenterdoes not apply to iCloud services because the records in
question did not "contain[] the type of precise location information" as was at issue in Carpenter);

United States v. Shipton, No. 0:18-CR-202-PJS-KMM, 2019 WL 5330928 (D. Minn. Sept. 11,
2019).
119
See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, No. 1:18-CR-00484-ELR-JFK, 2020 WL 5229042
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 14, 2020) (holding that Carpenter was not applicable to IP and subscriber
information obtained from Facebook). The Court distinguished Carpenterfrom the defendant's
situation because CSLI can track a defendant's location "with near GPS-level precision," whereas
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Fifth Circuit, have held that Carpenter is inapplicable to situations involving
cryptocurrency transactions and banking.12 0 Finally, several lower courts have
easily reaffirmed that Carpenter does not affect the privacy interests implicated
by more traditional surveillance methods, such as video camera surveillance.12 1
Lower courts declining to extend Carpenter'sreasoning, and thus extending the
mosaic theory to other intrusive, non-physical surveillance systems, represents
the overwhelming weight of authority since Carpenterwas decided. 122
B. Lower Courts Applying the Mosaic Theory to Other Forms of NonPhysical Surveillance
Despite most lower courts finding that the mosaic theory is inapplicable
outside of the CSLI context, some courts have maintained that Carpenter is
analogous to other forms of non-physical surveillance technology, either in its
express holding or in dicta. In United States v. Diggs, the Northern District of
Illinois determined that Carpenterwas applicable to warrantless acquisition of
GPS location technology in automobiles.1 23 The case involved more than a month
of GPS location history, which law enforcement obtained through a thirdparty.24 The Court's extensive reasoning relied on Carpenter, pointing out that
both CSLI and GPS location data are both "detailed, encyclopedic, and
effortlessly compiled . .. [and] provide an intimate window into a person's
life. .. "12 5 In other words, the probative value of the information would otherwise
be unobtainable through traditional investigation techniques.1 26 Additionally,

IP addresses can only disclose a singular, fixed location. Id. at *15 (citing Jenkins, 2019 WL

1568154, at *4).
120
See United States v. Gratkowski, 964 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding that defendant
lacked a privacy interest in his information located on a cryptocurrency service called

"Blockchain"); Zietzke v. United States, 426 F. Supp. 3d 758 (W. D. Wash. 2019).
121
See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 385 F. Supp. 3d 721 (E.D. Wis. 2019); United States v.
Harris, No. 17-CR-175-PP, 2021 WL 268322, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 27, 2021); United States v.
Gbenedio, No. 1:17-CR-430-TWT-JSA, 2019 WL 2177943, at *2 (N.D. Ga. 2019); United States
v. Moore-Bush, 963 F.3d 29 (lst Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 982 F.3d 50 (1st

Cir. 2020). Additionally, there is at least one case finding Carpenter inapplicable to a novel
situation where a defendant voluntarily conveyed his cellular phone password to law enforcement,
which in turn used it to unlock his phone and observe its contents pursuant to a search warrant. See

People v. Davis, 438 P.3d 266, 269 (Colo. 2019).
122

Additionally, a substantial amount of the citing references to Carpenterfind that it does not

apply retroactively, and even if it does, the "good faith" exception applies. See, e.g., United States
v. Castro-Aguirre, 983 F.3d 927 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v. Goldstein, 914 F.3d 200 (3d Cir.
2019).
123
385 F. Supp. 3d 648, 655 (N.D. II1. 2019).
124
Id. at 649-50.
125

Id.

at 653.

126
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018) (stating "the retrospective quality
of [CSLI] data here gives police access to a category of information otherwise unknowable").
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both technologies provide a "tracking capacity [that] runs against everyone."127
Finding GPS and CSLI analogous, the Court concluded that "the fact that the
police obtained the information from a third party does not overcome ... Fourth
Amendment protection." 128 Thus, the Court held that the mosaic theory was
applicable in contexts outside of CSLI.
Additionally, a lower court has extensively reasoned in dicta that
Carpenterwould be analogous to "geofencing" technology. In In re Information
Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, a court denied a warrant for
geofencing information sought by law enforcement in relation to an investigation
12 9
Geofencing is the act of
into the suspected theft of prescription medications.
"cast[ing] a virtual net ... around a particular location for a particular time
frame." 1 30 In this instance, law enforcement wanted to use the geo-fence "to
obtain Google's historical information about what devices were at those
locations at those times." 13 ' The Court reasoned in dicta that "there is much to
suggest that Carpenter's holding, on the question of whether the privacy interests
in CSLI over at least seven days, should be extended to the use of geofences
32
involving intrusions of much shorter duration."' The Court analogized CSLI to
geofencing by stating both technologies "cause [the user] to reveal their location
[to third-parties] with great regularity."133
The Court reasoned:
[I]t [is] difficult to imagine that users of electronic devices
would affinatively realize, at the time they begin using the
device, that they are providing their location information to
Google in a way that will result in the government's ability to
precise
cheaply-their
and
quickly,
obtain--easily,
geographical location at virtually any point in the history of their
34
use of the device.'
The Court moved on to reference other forms of non-physical surveillance
technology, such as "tower-dumps" and "real-time CSLI," stating that Carpenter
does not yield a firm basis for what should and should not be considered a

127

Id.

128

Diggs, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 653-54. (citing Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217, 2220); but see

LopezGamez v. State, 622 S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. App. 2020), petitionfor discretionaryreview
refused (Jan. 13, 2021) (holding that GPS tracking location in automobiles is not covered by
Carpenter).
129

481 F. Supp. 3d 730, 732 (N.D. Ill. 2020).

130

Id.

131

Id.

132

Id. at 737.

133

Id.

134

Id.
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"search.""' A tower dump is a type of technique in which law enforcement
collects CSLI information for "all devices that connected to [a particular] cell
site tower at a previous point in time."1 3 6 Real-time CSLI is information
generated by devices known as "cell-site simulators" or "Stingrays," which law
enforcement use to mimic cell sites and transmit a cellular phone's signal to the
Stingray.1 37 The Court, pointing to these two technologies-which are altogether
different from the issue it considered, the use of geofencing- indicates that there
is no clear standard for the Court to reference.' 38 Thus, the Court denied the
government's warrant application for geofencing location in relation to its
investigation.' 3 9
While these two decisions carry little persuasive authority, they indicate
that lower courts would entertain the application of Carpenter to different
contexts outside of CSLI. However, the majority of lower courts directly cite
Carpenteras a "one-off' decision, impliedly rejecting that the mosaic theory is
applicable to other technologies due to its expressly "narrow" holding.14 0 Given
the exponential rate of technological innovation-and corresponding utility of
non-physical surveillance to law enforcement investigations1 41-the Supreme
Court should consider outlining a broader standard, implementing Carpenter's
rationale, to expand the mosaic theory to other contexts and provide lower courts
with guidance to its parameters.
IV.

ADAPTING THE MOSAIC THEORY TO OTHER CONTEXTS

In light of lower courts' reticence to adopt the mosaic theory outside of
the CSLI context, the Supreme Court should articulate a broader and more
explicit standard for non-physical surveillance technology to aid in adapting the
Fourth Amendment to expanding technological capabilities. Issuing direct
guidance on the mosaic theory will allow lower courts to use the standard as a
guidepost to handle Fourth Amendment claims more effectively, increasing
judicial efficiency, while also allowing them to fill in "gaps" and step in to
protect constitutional rights. The rationale behind such a standard would be an
example of "mini-maximalism"-in other words, "there is a need [for lower
courts] to look to and rely on guidance from the judiciary" about when the mosaic
theory is implicated by non-physical surveillance technology in Fourth

'35
36

Id. at 738
Id. (citing United States v. Adkinson, 916 F.3d 605, 608 (7th Cir. 2019)).

"3

Id.

138

Id. at 739.

139
140

Id. at 757.
See, e.g., United States v. Trader, 981 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2020).
For example, law enforcement has access to historical CSLI, real-time CSLI,
tower dumps,

41

facial recognition, GPS location, and other forms of technology already, and this is without
considering future innovations to non-physical surveillance technology.
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Amendment cases. 4 2 While some scholars are skeptical about setting a broad
43
the
standard before definitive cases arise challenging new technologies,1
law
as
Supreme Court should give lower courts guidance to make such decisions,
enforcement currently utilizes analogous technologies to historical CLSI.
A.

ConceptualizingCarpenter's Extended Standard

The holding of Carpenterimpliedly adopted the mosaic theory, which
changes Fourth Amendment analysis. From the text of the decision, the Court
seems particularly skeptical of two principles of the third-party doctrine: (a) the
probative value of information is deeply revealing, to a degree that was
previously incomprehensible; and (b) the questionable voluntariness of the
defendant's decision to open his or her "circle of trust," or to divulge sensitive
information about his or her life to a commercial entity operating in our
technological landscape.
First, the Supreme Court was concerned with both the reasonable
expectations of privacy'4 and the probative value of the information law
145
The CSLI at hand contravened
enforcement obtained through the third-party.
and others would not ...
agents
enforcement
law
that
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single
every
catalogue
secretly monitor and
46
into a person's
window
intimate
an
"provides
period."' This is because CSLI
life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his 'familial,
47
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations."" Furthermore, the
technology is substantially easier and more efficient to use when compared to
"traditional investigative tools."14 t Additionally, the Court was seemingly
concerned that the non-physical surveillance technological capabilities surpassed
what could have been accomplished through more traditional investigatory
methods, stating "the retrospective quality of the data here gives police access to
49
a category of information otherwise unknowable."1 Traditional methods are
limited to the resources and abilities of the investigating law enforcement
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Lauren Cyphers, Note, MaximalistDecision Making: When Maximalism Is Appropriatefor
Appellate Courts, 123 W. VA. L. REV. 611, 626 (2020).
43
Orin S. Kerr, Implementing Carpenter, in THE DIGITAL FOURTH AMENDMENT (forthcoming),
33
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id= 01257.
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Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2019) (citing United States v. Jones, 565
U.S. 400, 430 (2012) ("'[S]ociety's expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others
for a very long
would not .. . secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement ...
period.' ... Allowing government access to [CSLI] contravenes that expectation.").
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Id. (concluding that allowing government access to [CSLI] contravenes society's reasonable

expectation to privacy).
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Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012)).
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agency; however, these limitations are not applicable to more modern sources of
non-physical surveillance." 0 Thus, part of the new standard should emphasize
that the probative value of the information is especially adverse to normative
privacy interests because it is of a type that traditional Fourth Amendment
analysis would not anticipate.
Second, the Court stressed the involuntariness of divulging sensitive
information to third parties.' 5' Here, the Court recognizes the "seismic shifts in
digital technology that made possible the tracking" in this case. 52 Furthermore,
the Court distinguished the nature of the parties-rather than being a typical
witness, the third party at hand was a commercial business involved in
telecommunications technology.1 53 Additionally, the "reduced expectations of
privacy" stem from the fact that the information was "knowingly shared with
another." 5 4 However, longer-term tracking, again, extending beyond the
boundary of what is reasonably possible through traditional surveillance
techniques, presents a different situation. 5 Moreover, the CSLI was not "truly
'shared' as tone normally understands the term." 5 6 There is very little
voluntariness in having your CSLI shared with a wireless carrier, outside of
turning on your phone, and it applies to "[v]irtually any activity on the
phone... ."' 7 The Court articulates no standard, and explicitly states that its
holding exclusively applies in the CSLI context. However, these two rationales
can be formulated into a standard to give lower courts guidance on how to apply
the mosaic theory into the future-whether the Supreme Court ultimately decides
in favor of the exclusion of the technology at hand from the third-party doctrine.
Moreover, there are no compelling reasons why the mosaic theory
cannot be invoked before seven days.1 58 Following the Court's own reasoning,

150
Id. (stating "[i]n the past, attempts to reconstruct a person's movements were limited by a
dearth of records and the frailties of recollection. With access to CSLI, [law enforcement] can now
travel back in time to retrace a person's whereabouts, subject only to the retention policies of the

wireless carrier ... ").
1s'
Id. at 2219.
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Id.
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Id. (stating that witnesses of this type are "ever alert, and their memory is nearly infallible").

While the first rationale-the wide scope of information-is not satisfied, the second line of
reasoning could arguably be applicable to several different records, including banking records,
cryptocurrency wallets or services, and iCloud services. The Court distinguishes this, stating that
there is a "world of difference" between the information collected. Id. However, it is outside the
scope of this Note to comment on more traditional formulation of the third-party doctrine.
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See id. 2217 n.3 (declining to articulate a standard for the mosaic theory past 7 days of
collected CSLI data).
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the severe implications of allowing law enforcement to obtain this type of
information without a warrant is also enough to completely foreclose the
possibility that it will ever be obtained in such a manner. First, data of
this type is much greater in scope and in depth than any traditional investigatory
method, so it follows that such information should only be available when law
enforcement is able to establish probable cause in front of a magistrate. Second,
the involuntary nature of the individual's disclosure makes for a compelling
argument because an individual is disclosing information without necessarily
being aware that he or she is doing so. Thus, the Court should insist that this
doctrine applies to any information, not just information collected in a less than
seven-day period.
The two-prong Carpenter formulation the Supreme Court should
consider is (a) "the deeply revealing nature" of the information collected by the
technology at hand; and (b) the involuntariness of transmitting the information
to a third party.' 5 9 This is a faithful application of Carpenter'sanalysis, while not
foreclosing the possibility that other current or future uses of non-physical
surveillance technology could also fall under the mosaic theory. Further, the
Court should adopt the standard to apply as a wholesale exclusion from the thirdparty doctrine. Because the nature of collection involves both deeply revealing
information and involuntary activity, police should be required to apply for a
warrant when using the technology during an investigation, with the normal
exception of exigent circumstances.1 60 This ensures that there is never a situation
where police are warrantlessly using a deeply revealing technology for an
extended period, even if police would eventually be required to obtain a warrant.

159

See id. There have been other standards recommended for implementing Carpenter. While

this one differs from the "Carpentertest" discussed above, it is also similar-attempting to stay
true to Carpenter'srationale while emphasizing it can be applicable to different contexts. See Ohm,
supra note 97 (stating that Carpenter's test consists of: "(1) 'the deeply revealing nature' of the

information; (2) 'its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach;' and (3) 'the inescapable and
automatic nature of its collection.' Additionally, other scholars have formulated different
proposals. See Kerr, supra note 143 (arguing that the test implementing Carpentershould be: (a)
the records exist because of the digital age; (b) they were created without meaningful voluntary

choice; and (c) they tend to reveal the privacies of life).
160 See United States v. Saemisch, 371 F. Supp. 3d 37, 42 (D. Mass. 2019) (holding that law
enforcement's use of real-time CSLI did not violate Carpenter because the defendant "posed a
potentially imminent threat to the safety of identified minor children").
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The Mosaic Theory Is PotentiallyApplicable to Other Technologies

Since Carpenter has been handed down, lower courts have been
reluctant to apply its reasoning to other contexts despite analogous factual
scenarios. 16' Carpenter'sreasoning, however, can be applied to these scenarios
faithfully, and lower courts should be encouraged to step up and protect Fourth
Amendment principles when these situations are sufficiently analogous. Indeed,
analogous situations have already arisen involving non-physical surveillance
technology which law enforcement already utilizes in investigations. 162 Below, I
will examine three different types of non-physical surveillance technology that
is currently used by law enforcement: Real-time CSLI or "Stingrays,"
"geofencing," and "tower dumps."
First, real-time CSLI, or a Stingray, as explained above, is when law
enforcement uses a device to mimic a cell site tower. When a cellular phone user
is in the area of the Stingray, the cellular phone will become confused and
connect with the Stingray instead of a regular cell site tower. This information is
more particularized than historical CSLI, as a Stingray can only connect with a
cellular phone when it is within range of a cell site. A Stingray is not able to pick
up any cellular phone signal anywhere, anytime. However, Stingrays certainly
exemplify a novel use of technology that was not possible before the digital age.
Real-time CSLI is analogous to the historical CSLI in Carpenter and
satisfies the first prong of the proposed standard because it potentially reveals
sensitive information. While less comprehensive than the historical CSLI in
Carpenter, police would still be able to garner a comprehensive amount of
information without having to personally and visually surveil a suspect.
Additionally, law enforcement would be able to put together sensitive
information about an individual's life based on the movements of their person.
For example, a person could go to the store, visit a religious or community
association, or partake in their personal, private hobbies. Law enforcement,
through normal visual surveillance, would be able to track an individual and
garner this information without a warrant. The significant difference is that
Stingray makes this information "remarkably easy, cheap, and efficient
compared to traditional investigative tools." 163
Additionally, real-time CSLI is not voluntary in any normative sense. By
mere operation of a cellular phone, any suspect would be potentially transmitting
their cellular phone signal out to law enforcement who is mimicking a cellular
phone tower. This may violate our societal expectation of privacy because while

161
See United States v. Diggs, 385 F. Supp. 3d 648, 654 (N.D. II1. 2019) (quoting Carpenter,
138 S. Ct. at 2219) (reasoning that the mosaic theory applies to a GPS system in an automobile
because the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the "in the whole of his physical
movements"); In re Search of Info. Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, 481 F. Supp. 3d 730,
756 (N.D. 111. 2020) (reasoning that Carpenter'sholding may be applicable to geofencing).
162
See Diggs, F. 385 F. Supp. 3d at 654.
163
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
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we may be out on public roads for all to see, we certainly do not expect our
cellular phone to be transmitting our exact location to police, who could be up to
miles away. Simply operating a cell phone, a virtual necessity for any social or
working individual, reveals the individual's location to law enforcement
investigation. Thus, the two-prongs of Carpenter are potentially implicated by
this technology.
Second, geofencing is another type of non-physical surveillance
technology that could be implicated by a broader formulation of Carpenter.
Geofencing is a type of technology which "cast[s] a virtual net" on cellular phone
activity within a given area. 164 Any cellular phone, or cellular device, that is in
the area of the geofence would be revealed by the technology.1 65 However,
geofencing an area does not have to be limited to any particular area, or for any
particular amount of time. Additionally, many businesses use it for purposes such
166
Moreover, it uses GPS and Bluetooth to
as targeted advertising to consumers.
location.1 67
user's
phone
cellular
individual
an
out
figure
Geofencing may be implicated by a broader standard of Carpenter for
similar reasons as above. First, it is revealing information because it can convey
a cellular phone user's location in an easy and efficient manner, even when law
enforcement is not present in the area. Such location does not have to be
exclusively in a public area; it can be utilized to search for individuals who have
entered into private residences or buildings. Most concerning, it can implicate
multiple individuals' location information, not just a particular person.
Furthermore, as with CSLI, this information is conveyed in a far from voluntary
manner. By virtue of using a cellular phone, and being in a particular location,
you will be caught in the virtual net of a geofence. This can happen with "great
65
regularity," just as in Carpenter. This is done "easily, cheaply, and
69
effectively," like historical CSLI data.1 Thus, a broader standard and increased
scrutiny on these practices could render a court to determine that this use of nonphysical surveillance runs afoul of the mosaic theory.
Finally, "tower dumps" could become an unfavored practice requiring a
warrant if Carpenter'srationale is extended to apply to technologies outside of
the historical CSLI context. Tower dumps extract historical CSLI from every
cellular phone that was connected to a specific cell site within a specified time
period. 70 By its nature, this involves more access than a regular historical CSLI

16
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See In re Search of Info. at Premises Controlled by Google, 481 F. Supp. 3d at 732.
Id.

166 See Amber Kemmis, What Is Geofencing? Everything You Need to Know About LocationBased Marketing, SMARTBUG (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.smartbugmedia.com/blog/what-isgeofencing.
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Id.
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See In re Search of Info. at Premises Controlled by Google, 481 F. Supp. 3d at 737.
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In fact, the FBI recently used this technique to quickly secure data on someone who entered
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the Capitol during the riot at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. See Ken Klippenstein & Eric
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record information because it includes more user data."' In fact, one federal
court has observed that "[a]ny order authorizing a cell tower dump is likely to
affect at least hundreds of individuals' privacy interests."1 7 2
Tower dumps are information obtained through third-party companies,
similar to historical CSLI. While it may be anonymized, and not particularized,
it would still be an inquiry which exposes the totality of a person's physical
location for a certain period of time. Additionally, it would potentially reveal to
law enforcement individuals' associational groups or other organizations of a
similar kind. However, the inquiry is limited to a specific cell site tower, usually
for a specific period of time. While the mosaic theory states that a lot of nonsearches may add up to a search, here, the technological capabilities would be a
vast collection of CSLI data for a relatively limited time period. On the other
hand, it seems as though it would be an invasion of privacy to state that police
cannot obtain one person's CSLI data unless armed with a warrant, but they may
permissibly obtain hundreds, if not thousands of individuals' CSLI data.
Moreover, the voluntariness rationale is not met for similar reasons as laid out
above: the data collection merely requires that a group of individuals have
cellular phones, and that it be connected to a cell site. A lower court could
reasonably conclude that tower dumps stand in violation of Carpenter'sholding
because of the revealing nature of its qualitative data collection and the
involuntariness of the collection itself.
However, if the Fourth Amendment was to encompass geofencing, it
would be an expansion of the mosaic theory which diminishes previous Supreme
Court precedent, contrary to United States v. Knotts. In Knotts, the Supreme
Court held that "'augment[ed]' visual surveillance did not constitute a search"
because any individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
public movements.1 73 However, it is important to distinguish the type of
surveillance technology at hand. In Knotts, law enforcement used a beeper,
placed into a container of chloroform by one of the defendant's co-

Lichtblau, FBI Seized CongressionalCellphone Records Related to CapitolAttack, THE INTERCEPT
(Feb. 22, 2021), https://theintercept.com/2021/02/22/capitol-riot-fbi-cellphone-records/;

Craig

Timberg, Drew Harwell, & Spencer S. Hsu, Police Let Most Capitol Rioters Walk Away. But
Cellphone Data and Videos Could Now Lead to More Arrests, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/01 /08/trump-mob-tech-arrests/ ("Think rioters
walked away scot free? Not so fast, say police with potent technology ready to name names.").
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Mason Kortz & Christopher Bavitz, Cell Tower Dumps, Bos. BAR J. (Mar. 18, 2019),
https://bostonbarjoumal.com/2019/03/18/cell-towerdumps/#:~:text-That%20said%2C%20a%20typical%20tower,time%20than%20does%20historic
al%20CSLI (last visited Nov. 19, 2021).
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In re Search of Cellular Telephone Towers, 945 F. Supp. 2d 769, 770 (S.D. Tex. 2013)

(holding that the government had established probable cause for the tower dumps; however, it
should be noted that this decision arose before the Supreme Court's decision in Carpenter).
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Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2215 (2018) (quoting United States v. Knotts,
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conspirators.17 4 This can be distinguished from geofences for two reasons. First,
law enforcement had already obtained the cooperation of a third party, one of the
defendant's co-conspirators, to whom he had voluntarily opened his circle of
trust. Second, geofencing is hardly voluntary, as it catches cell phone information
for any device within its parameters. Thus, a lower court could seriously question
the applicability of Knotts to each of these more modern technologies.
This list is not meant to be exhaustive. There are other technologies
which may run afoul of a newly revisited Fourth Amendment meant to be
adapted to the digital world. In fact, the First Circuit is currently preparing to
address en banc whether its position on traditional video surveillance technology
75
This is not to mention the various
should be adjusted in light of Carpenter.1'
technologies that may be developed in the near or far future. Furthermore, it is
not entirely clear how marketplace adjustments will affect individual privacy
rights.1'7 6 Needless to say, citizens should not have to rely on whether their
wireless carrier is dedicated to protecting their privacy. A new standard,
providing guideposts to lead the Fourth Amendment to the digital age, will both
protect citizens rights in the short-term and help define the mosaic theory in the
long-term.
C. A BroaderAdaptation of the Mosaic Theory Is Desirableto Provide
Lower Courts with Increased Guidance
A clarified, broader standard of Carpenter is necessary to provide
adequate guideposts to lower courts, so they can adapt the Fourth Amendment to
a changing technological and digital landscape. Judicial decision-making can be
enhanced through adapting Carpenter, with an increase in judicial efficiency;
allowance of a robust deliberation and case law before the Supreme Court
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ultimately decides the issues; and ensuring that citizens receive the full protection
of the Fourth Amendment while surveillance techniques develop. Giving lower
courts a proper framework to address these issues will lead to more precise
reasoning and better deliberation, before the Supreme Court ultimately refines
the doctrine addressing digital technology.177 Intrinsically, this will be a positive
development because it will lead to greater judicial efficiency-allowing lower
courts to do their job before the novel issues ultimately reach the Supreme Court.
Additionally, it will allow lower courts to properly address defendants'
constitutional arguments.
Judicial efficiency will be improved as a result of a broader standard of
Carpenter because lower courts will be in an adequate position to decide the
issues from an informed standpoint and a refined definition of the mosaic theory.
With the "deeply revealing" nature of the technology at issue and lack of
voluntariness already defined, lower courts will be able to analogize and
distinguish the similarities and differences of the technologies at issue in the
motions to suppress as they present themselves. This will presumably lead to a
greater deliberation of the issues and better reasoning. Instead of determining the
issue at the Supreme Court level on a case-by-case basis, lower courts will be
armed to determine the lines of the mosaic theory themselves, before the issue
ultimately comes up to the Supreme Court level. Lower courts may take a
diversity of approaches, all of which will better inform the Supreme Court before
it makes an ultimate determination on the limitations of the doctrine.
Additionally, this approach will better inform law enforcement about the
constitutionally permissible lines applicable to their investigations. As selfinterested actors, law enforcement would not want to engage in any investigatory
techniques which may endanger a criminal investigation. This is backed up by
the Supreme Court endorsing the practice of drawing "bright-lines" to ensure law
enforcement is properly informed about constitutional boundaries.' 78 In turn, this
will lead to better law enforcement practices in both the short and long-term and
provide for a reasonable equilibrium between enforcement of our laws and civil
liberties. While some scholars prefer the Supreme Court to take an approach
which emphasizes caution and greater clarity before ultimately deciding these
issues, 17 9 the better approach is to give lower courts greater latitude in applying

177
Most lower courts quickly analyze the issues without a thorough examination of the
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1 (1st Cir. 2019); United States v. Coleman, No. 1:18-CR-00484-ELR-JFK, 2020 WL 5229042
(N.D. Ga. 2020).

178

See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,

458 (1981) (stating "'Fourth Amendment doctrine' . .. 'ought to be expressed in terms that are

readily applicable by the police. . .and [not] qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, or buts .... .') (citing
Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The
Robinson
Dilemma,
1934
SUP.
CT.
REv.
127,
141
(1974),
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/scr.1974.3108707).
179
See Kerr, supra note 143.

2022]

THE MOSAIC THEORY

685

'

these principles, so informed decisions are made at those levels. Thus, a newly
clarified standard will better inform law enforcement about the investigative
decisions they will be making during the course of their work.
In the meantime, this will substantially affect parties' rights, filling in
apply a standard which can potentially conform to the Court's
to
gaps
formulation of the mosaic theory. With a clarified holding that lower courts can
use to adapt differing factual scenarios, they will apply those to the law in a
variety of ways. Thus, the legal debate surrounding the Fourth Amendment in
the digital world will increase, and courts will be able to interpret a wide range
of applications implicating the mosaic theory. Allowing lower courts broader
latitude in applying Carpenter's principles will increase the thoughtfulness of
the lower courts when applying these concepts to new technologies to ensure the
Supreme Court is able to review cases which reflect a variety of viewpoints on
the nexus of technology and the Fourth Amendment.
It is important to remember that these technologies are being used by law
enforcement currently. 180 Declining to articulate a standard that can be adaptable
to current and future technologies essentially render criminal defendants helpless
while the mosaic theory's boundaries are sorted out. If these non-physical
surveillance technologies are implicated by the Supreme Court's articulation of
the mosaic theory, criminal defendants may be convicted while the court
determines the doctrine's scope on a case-by-case basis. Most concerning for
criminal defendants is the potential to be convicted while the mosaic theory is
being defined, as prosecutors will be apt to rely on the "good faith" exception to
8
circumvent the exclusionary rule and uphold their previous convictions.'
Therefore, the Court should define the scope of the mosaic theory in order to
ensure that these victims can avail themselves of their constitutional rights, if
those are potentially at stake.
V.

CONCLUSION

Because Carpenter's narrow holding has been restrictive in allowing
lower courts to reach determinations on what non-physical surveillance
technologies are applicable to the mosaic theory, a broader standard based on
Carpenter'sreasoning should be articulated in order to clearly define the doctrine
moving forward. A standard with a clear application can be articulated while
staying true to Carpenter'srationale, hinging on the "deeply revealing nature"
82
of the information acquired and the involuntariness of the conveyance.'
Moreover, this technology is presently being employed by law enforcement,

See United States v. Diggs, 385 F. Supp. 3d 648 (N.D. Ill. 2019); In re Search of Info. at
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There are multiple examples of this exact scenario unfolding for criminal defendants who
were convicted, in part, upon warrantless CSLI before Carpenter.See, e.g., United States v. Castro181

Aguirre, 938 F.3d 927 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v. Goldstein, 914 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2019).
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making the issue altogether more pressing for lower courts, criminal defendants,
and law enforcement agencies. Finally, a standard with clear guideposts will
enable lower courts to determine the mosaic theory's doctrine moving forward
into a world with exponentially increasing technological innovation.
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